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ROAD FROM RECEIVERSHIP:
CLAUDE PEPPER, THE DUPONT TRUST,
AND THE FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY
by A LEXANDER R. S TOESEN *

the longest labor dispute in United States
I history came1971,
to an end when a settlement was reached in the
N

DECEMBER

Florida East Coast Railway strike.1 It began in January 1963, and
was viewed nationally as a test case of railway labor work rules.
Hopes for an early conclusion faded, however, as each side dug in
2
for a fight to the bitter end. Strife was not new to the troubled
history of the FEC; it had been an object of controversy for many
years, and possibly the violence-torn decade of the 1960s might
have been avoided if it had been merged with a major trunk line.
Instead, it became an independent line controlled by a subsidiary
of the Florida duPont interests. The question of control was one
of the basic issues which confronted those concerned with the
complex bankruptcy proceedings that involved the line in the late
1940s.
At that time two major figures in Florida’s history— Senator
Claude Pepper and Edward Ball, senior trustee of the Alfred I.
duPont estate— clashed over the future of the railroad. On the
surface they seemed to be concerned with questions of finance,
personnel, and the “public interest,” but in reality much more
was at stake. The FEC case became a microcosm of a larger conflict which left a lasting imprint on the political and economic
life of Florida. The technicalities of the bankruptcy proceedings
were complicated by the reverberations of strong personalities
and their knowledge of the deeper issues involved. This became
apparent as the matter was argued and reargued for years before
the Interstate Commerce Commission and the courts. Ball finally
won the railroad, and Pepper’s political career was temporarily
* Mr. Stoesen is chairman, Department of History, Guilford College,
Greensboro, North Carolina.
1. Wall Street Journal, December 20, 1971; July 3, 1972.
2. J. Richard Elliott, “Road From Serfdom, The Florida East Coast Is
Signalling the Way,” Barron’s, XLIV (May 11, 1964), 3.
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Florida East Coast Railway, Atlantic Coast Line, and Apalachicola Northern
Systems in Florida

derailed, but along the way the Senator had predicted trouble
for labor if the line went to the duPont interests. His predictions
came true, and railway labor, which opposed him, learned from
hard experience the accuracy of his forecast.
The strike came shortly after the St. Joe Paper Company, a
subsidiary of the Alfred I. duPont Trust, gained full control of
the railroad, a process that had taken twenty years. However, the
real beginnings of the story can be traced back to 1926, when
duPont became a citizen of Florida— the year after Pepper arrived in the state.3
The contrast between Pepper and duPont could not have
been sharper. Claude Pepper had lived under a financial shadow
3. “Statement Regarding Reorganization Proceedings, Florida East Coast
Railway by the Trustees of the Alfred I. duPont Estate,” July 1947, copy
in Claude Pepper Papers, Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.
Other Pepper Papers are in the Claude Pepper Law Offices, Miami
Beach. Hereinafter noted as Pepper Papers, FRC or MB.
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all his life, had pulled himself up by his bootstraps, been graduated Phi Beta Kappa from the University of Alabama, and had
obtained a law degree at Harvard in 1924. After a year of teaching at the University of Arkansas, he moved to Perry, Florida, in
1925, to work for a land development company. He hoped to pay
off the family debt of about $1,000.4 On the other hand, Alfred I.
duPont was a scion of one of the wealthiest industrial families of
America. Weary of the power struggles in the E. I. duPont
deNemours Company, he “made up his mind to do what he could
to rehabilitate Florida” after the collapse of the boom in 1926.
With his brother-in-law Ed Ball he began a search for opportunities to invest his personal fortune of $34,000,000.5
Thus duPont moved in to pick up the pieces of the state’s
shattered economy. Seeking to “salvage something on which a
chastened and perhaps wiser populace could rebuild,” he was
“spectacularly successful and . . . kept the Sunshine State afloat
during the thirties.“6 DuPont died in 1935, and an estate trust
was set up with Ball as the dominant trustee. Outside of holdings
in the E. I. duPont deNemours Company, most of duPont’s
fortune was invested in Florida. Few provisions of the will were
made public: Mrs. duPont was to receive an annuity, a crippled
children’s home in Delaware was to be supported, and Dr. Francis
P. Gaines of Washington and Lee University was to be Ball’s
successor.7 DuPont’s work was carried on by Ball, who was “ever
present with wise counsel and financial strength . . . to promote
the well-being of the citizens of Florida.“8
After the collapse in 1926 of the land company that had
brought him to Florida, Pepper decided to remain in Perry. He
admitted that life was “dull” there, but it made “living cheap,”
4. Alexander R. Stoesen, “The Senatorial Career of Claude D. Pepper”
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1965), 1-27.
5. Marquis James, Alfred I. duPont, The Family Rebel (Indianapolis, 1941),
398, 401.
6. Ibid., 398; Elliott, “Road From Serfdom,” 3.
7. Champion McD. Davis to Claude Pepper, October 1, 1946, Pepper Papers,
FRC; Interstate Commerce Commission Reports, “Finance Docket 13170,
Florida East Coast Railway Company Reorganization” (April 8, 1947),
Vol. 267, 295, 313-14. Hereinafter, “Finance Docket 13170,” Interstate
Commerce Commission Reports will be cited by volume number, ICC,
and the page on which the decision begins, with date if not previously
cited.
8. Francis Pendleton Gaines, Edward Ball and the Alfred I. duPont Tradition (New York, 1959), 21.
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and hopefully his new position as a law partner of Judge William
B. Davis would be good “from the money point of view.“9 In the
long run it proved better politically. Pepper served in the Florida
House of Representatives in 1928. and on the state Democratic
Executive Committee. Although he lost a challenge for Park
Trammell’s senate seat in 1934, two years later, partly as a reward
for his “sportsmanlike” acceptance of disputed 1934 returns, he
was unopposed for the unexpired term of United States Senator
Duncan U. Fletcher. Pepper became known as an ardent New
Dealer and spokesman for labor and the “little man.” In 1938,
his primary victory was credited with materially aiding the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act.10
The duPont Trust had been moving to acquire real estate,
banks, and industrial property, and was thought to be “the
strongest economic and political influence in Florida.” There was
“no visible opposition” to its efforts to “take over” the state.11
Ball was described as a man with the “ability to see good in
something nobody else wants, a willingness to back his bet with
money, and the patience to wait for a return.” The duPont
Trust’s purchase of Florida East Coast Railway bonds beginning
in 1941 was “an example of this happy knack.“12
This was the ripest plum to be plucked. Built between 1885
and 1911 by Henry M. Flagler, it had spurred the development
of South Florida.13 After Flagler’s death, the line was extended
and improved by an issue of second general mortgage refunding
bonds, but by 1931 it was unable to meet either its operating expenses or fixed charges, and in August of that year it went into
receivership. The road under receivership operated “successfully
and profitably,” interest payments were kept up on the first
mortgage bonds, and a surplus of cash was accumulated. With
the coming of World War II, activity on the east coast of Florida
accelerated, and by 1945 the road had accumulated a surplus
of about $20,000,000.14
9. Pepper to his parents (Mr. and Mrs. Joseph W. Pepper), July 7, 1925,
Pepper Papers, MB.
10. Stoesen, “Senatorial Career,” 32-54, 124-31.
11. Mrs. Willis M. Ball to Pepper, August 25, 1944, Pepper Papers, FRC.
12. Freeman Lincoln, “The Terrible-Tempered Mr. Ball,” Fortune, XLVI
(November 1952), 144.
13. Sidney W. Martin, Florida’s Flagler (Athens, 1949).
14. “In the matter of Florida East Coast Railway Company, Debtor, Proceedings in the Reorganization of a Railroad. In the District Court of
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In 1936 creditors had begun to demand their lien rights. The
district court required them to work out a compromise, resulting
in the formation of a “5% Bondholders’ Committee” which
sought to retrieve the railroad from the court. In 1940, the Interstate Commerce Commission began to move toward a plan of
reorganization. It refused to become involved in the complex lien
question, maintaining its chief concern was the “public interest.”
This, the commission felt, could best be served by placing the
line under efficient, knowledgeable management.15
In railroad reorganizations the ICC follows Section 77 of the
federal Bankruptcy Act. Creditors are invited to submit plans of
reorganization, and the commission accepts one or devises its own.
By 1941, the ICC had two plans under consideration. One was
from the 5% Committee and the other from the trustees of the
duPont estate. Both plans claimed the “public interest” as a
major consideration.16
The plans were “in general substantially the same,” the chief
difference being in the control of the railroad. The 5% Committee called for three “reorganization managers”: the 5% Committee, the “institutional” bondholders, and the courts, each appointing one. A board of directors would be designated by the managers for aproval by the court. The duPont trustees envisioned a
five-member “reorganization committee”: two members appointed
by themselves, two from other bondholder groups, and one from
the court. A board of directors would be elected annually by
stockholders. In that proposal, in exchange for $4,000,000 in new
capital, the Florida East Coast would issue 400,000 new shares of
common stock to the Trust, making it the majority stockholder.
The 5% Committee wanted new capital to come from operating
revenues and claimed duPont capitalization would force them to
“surrender . . . part of the ownership of their property.“17
On August 10, 1942, the ICC announced a plan of its own.
Valuing the railroad at $37,000,000, instead of $29,896,000, as the
5% Committee had, or $53,796,000, the duPonts’figure, the commission noted that “extraordinary economic conditions” genthe United States for the Southern District of Florida, January 22, 1949.
[Opinion of] Samuel H. Sibley, Judge Designate,” copy in Pepper Papers,
FRC; 267 ICC 295, 323, 333, 360ff.
15. 252 ICC 423 (April 6, 1942), 423-24, 431.
16. Ibid., 431-49.
17. Ibid., 437-38.
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erated by the war had improved the line’s finances to the point
where new capital could be secured from “current and prospective earnings.” It incorporated the 5% Committee idea of three
managers and left out the duBont interests altogether.18 This
decision did not survive in the district court, where it was disapproved on October 19, 1943, as “inequitable,” because the accumulation of cash on hand did not “afford due recognition to
the rights of security holders” and because the duPont Trust was
not allowed to designate a reorganization manager.19
The case went back to the commission. With the reorganization proceedings at a standstill, the duPont Trust continued to
buy first and refunding mortgage bonds in the name of the St.
Joe Paper Company, which already ran the Apalachicola Northern Railroad. Soon it had a majority position among the creditors
with bonds worth a principle amount of $23,259,000. Most of
these had been purchased from owners who had deposited securities with the 5% Committee, but who now preferred cash at a
loss to the vagaries of interminable litigation. By 1944, the 5%
Committee had less than $1,500,000 worth of bonds on deposit.20
On November 8, 1944, the “S. A. Lynch interests,” a group of
bondholders, proposed keeping financial control, but placing operational control of the FEC in the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad.
An ACL brief stated the “public interest” would be served best
by making the FEC “part of an existing major railroad system,”
questioned the ability of the St. Joe Paper Company to run a
railroad, and considered St. Joe’s concern for the public interest
“problematical” at best. In response to this, the ICC castigated
the Coast Line for its poor showing during the depression of the
1930s and said there would be an “unwise increase in fixed
charges for the Coast Line” and an excessive drain on the FEC
treasury. The ACL-Lynch proposal was deemed “prima facie impracticable.“21
The ICC yielded to the dominant duPont position. An order
of January 8, 1945, contained the words: “It is thus apparent that
the duPont Estate will have control of the reorganized company.”
Under the plan the line would be run for five years by a “voting
18.
19.
20.
21.

252 ICC 731 (August 10, 1942); 252 ICC 423, 457, 455.
261 ICC 151 (January 8, 1945), 151-52.
Ibid., 151, 184.
Ibid., 187-91.
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trust” made up of two St. Joe trustees and one approved by the
court. They would hold on deposit the new common capital
stock of the reorganized company.22
In the opening months of 1945 the Coast Line proposed that
the FEC be merged into its own system with an exchange of ACL
stock for FEC bonds. The Coast Line would later claim that this
was the first time the true “public interest” issue was injected
into the matter. Up to this point, according to the Coast Line,
the ICC had been concerned only with the “financial or security
aspects of the case,” a statement which contained a degree of
accuracy.23 The commission had been involved almost totally in
the private interest problems of capitalization and the relative
rights of creditors, despite its claim to be working in the “public
interest.”
It was now that Pepper began to move to make his opposition
to the duPont Trust “visible.” In 1934, during his abortive campaign against Senator Trammell, he had promised the voters
that, if elected, he would “not have been in the U. S. Senate a
week” before stepping “at least upon the small toe of Big Business.“24 By 1945, he had become a senator with a national and to
some extent an international reputation, but his political views
remained essentially the same. While there might have been some
advantage to an attack on business in the depths of the depression, one might ask whether it was so wise during the closing
months of World War II. American business was claiming a
major share in winning the war and was offering promises of a
better life for all in the postwar era. Pepper, however, refused to
accept the idea that the operations of the duPont Trust, or any
other large business organization for that matter, were beneficial
to the people of Florida. He chose to attack the duPont Trust
with full force at a time of peak prosperity. It coincided with the
beginning of his own political demise.
There was much in Ball’s favor in any contest he entered.
With his money, friends, and imperious attitude, he was one of
the most formidable forces in the economic and political life of
the state. He claimed that at one time he had been Pepper’s
22. Ibid., 185-86.
23. Champion McD. Davis, “Memorandum for Conference with Senator Pepper,” July 24, 1946, Pepper Papers, FRC.
24. Claude Pepper, “Basic Speech,” 1934 campaign, Pepper Papers, MB.
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friend. “In the early days,” he said, he had “helped the buzzard
get elected.“25 But it soon became evident that he and Pepper
were natural political enemies. So, despite Ball’s kingmaking potential, Pepper would never seek his favor, and, in fact, he moved
in the opposite direction. For example, in February 1944, Pepper
eloquently defended President Roosevelt’s veto of a tax bill containing clauses which would provide benefits for holders of bonds
bought at bargain rates for speculative purposes.26 The benefits
were made to order for the duPont position in the FEC case, and,
although the veto was overridden, Pepper’s action was not forgotten. This and other stances caused Pepper to become the object of a campaign aimed at destroying him “once and for all.“27
The first chance for this came in the 1944 primaries. Although
Ball took a leading role in raising money for Pepper’s defeat,
he was not successful. Pepper’s opponent, J. Ollie Edmonds, president of Stetson University, lost the election, according to Ball,
because he was too nice: “I told Ollie he couldn’t follow Marquis
of Queensberry rules in a barroom brawl, but he wouldn’t
listen.“28 Ball was said to be in a state of “frenzy” in his opposition to Pepper and was determined to wipe out the Senator’s ever
narrowing margin of victory at the polls.29 Although Ball’s support of Edmonds would be played up in the press as a major
reason for the Pepper-Ball animosity, it was more of a symptom
than a cause.30 Pepper was diametrically and fundamentally opposed to all that Ball epitomized in the way of special interests,
the arrogance of wealth and power, and “monopoly.”
After “serious reflection” and the decision that he would be
“delinquent” in his duty if he did not move to “protect the public interest,” Pepper filed a memorandum on April 13, 1945, “in
consideration of the public interest,” calling for a reopening of
the FEC case.31 He supported the application of the ACL or “any
25. Lincoln, “Terrible-Tempered Mr. Ball,” 156.
26. Congressional Record, 78 Cong., 2nd sess., 2049-50.
27. Robert Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South; Stars of the New
Confederacy (New York, 1968), 139.
28. Lincoln, “Terrible-Tempered Mr. Ball,” 158.
29. Sherrill, Gothic Politics, 142.
30. Orlando Morning Sentinel, February 1, 1945; Ft. Lauderdale Daily News,
August 7, 1945; Miami Herald, May 22, 1947.
31. Florida East Coast Railway Reorganization, transcript of argument at
Washington, D. C., May 29, 1945, 1311; “Memorandum by Senator Claude
Pepper of Florida in Support of a Rehearing in this Case, Filed in His
Capacity as a Citizen of Florida and on Behalf of the Public,” April 13,
1945, 1, Pepper Papers, FRC.
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other competent rail carrier . . . to acquire and or operate the
Florida East Coast Railroad.” In Pepper’s view, the ICC ruling
in favor of the duPont interests meant that it had “wholly renounced its function . . . to protect the public and promote the
public welfare.” Alluding to the duPont capitalization proposal,
he said the ICC was delivering to them a property worth $40,000,000 for ten cents on the dollar. He was not, however, questioning
anyone’s investment policies, but was concerned with management of the railroad in the best interest of the public32 When he
entered the case Pepper knew what he was doing, who his opponents were, and what the consequences might be. It was a step
that virtually guaranteed the creation of the “most elaborate
crusade of political annihilation ever conducted in southern politics.”33
A short time later, on May 29, 1945, Pepper, in oral argument
before the commission, again pressed for a reopening. He began
by discussing the Bankruptcy Act and the precedents of the ICC
in railroad reorganizations, but quickly shifted to what became a
constant drumbeat in the proceedings— his attack on duPont
power in Florida and the autocratic methods of Ball. He said it
was apparent the ‘“Commission did not have the facts about the
duPont estate” or its dominant trustee. The commission’s latest
order would place 16.3 per cent of Florida’s railroad mileage at
the “uncontrolled discretion of one man,” who in the past had
“not been averse to attempting to influence public policy.“34 The
weight of Pepper’s elected position and the claim that the ICC
had lacked information and had been derelect in its duty brought
a reopening of the case. November hearings were scheduled for
West Palm Beach and Washington, D. C.
Faced with the reopening of the case, opponents of the Coast
Line plan sprang into action to mobilize opinion against it. A
number of pamphlets were issued, two of which bore the name of
W. F. Howard, general chairman of the Brotherhood of Railway
Clerks. His most reasonable point was that FEC employees would
have to move to other cities if the merger took place, but otherwise his papers stirred the emotion rather than the intellect. He
32. Pepper, “Memorandum,” April 13, 1945, 9ff.
33. Sherrill, Gothic Politics, 140.
34. Railway Reorganization, argument, May 29, 1945, 1308-11.
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took a strong stand in favor of duPont control. The FEC should
be “preserved as an INDEPENDENT INSTITUTION OWNED
AND OPERATED BY FLORIDA PEOPLE,” he claimed, but
for “some unexplained reason” Pepper supported the ACL petition for “the sale” of a Florida owned institution to out-of-state
interests. The merger constituted forced sale of the property
which sounded “more like the rantings of Nazis than it does the
citizens of a free and democratic country.” He urged those on the
east coast to “rise up in opposition to the request of Senator
Pepper and the Atlantic Coast Line.“35
Pepper was correct in his observation that it “would be naive
indeed” to think that these pamphlets “were written by anyone
other than a skillful propagandist” because Frank D. Upchurch
of St. Augustine later admitted he had a hand in it.36 The attack
was something of a surprise and a discomfort to a labor advocate
like Pepper. A complaint was registered with the ICC about “misleading propaganda,” but nothing could be done to stop it and
efforts to counter it were of little effect.37
Pepper pointed “with pride” to his labor record, and urged
labor to rely on his estimate that their interests would be protected under the Coast Line plan. He, too, indulged in namecalling, saying he knew of “nothing in the duPont’s record that
can assure the laboring man of fair treatment.” He, for one, could
not “visualize Mr. Ball in the role of a benefactor of labor.” Pepper warned, “If this road is put in the hands of the duPont interests, my friends among the workers will regret it to the end of
their lives.“38 He was right, but in the 1940s Pepper’s seemed to
be a voice crying in the wilderness.
Pepper had planned a trip to Europe at the end of World
War II, so despite the fact that he had petitioned for new hearings, he was abroad when they were held. Champion McD. Davis,
president of the Coast Line, cabled him in Bucharest, Rumania,
saying it would be “fatal” if he was not present at the West Palm
Beach hearings. The opposition was “making capital” of the like35. The Cat Is Out of the Bag, Now It Must Be Summarily Dealt With, 3;
An Urgent Plea by Employees of the Florida East Coast Railway to All
Citizens on the East Coast of Florida, 7, 14, 15, Pepper Papers, FRC.
36. “Memorandum by Claude Pepper, Senator from the State of Florida In
His Capacity as a Citizen of Florida and On Behalf of the Public. On
Plan of Reorganization,” February 14, 1946, 41, Pepper Papers, FRC.
37. 267 ICC 295, 332-34.
38. Pepper, “Memorandum,” February 14, 1946, 40, 47.
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lihood of his absence, and “will completely ridicule if you do not
appear at all.“39 But Pepper did not “deem it necessary . . . to
appear at hearing,” and promised to file a written statement upon
returning. 40 As a result, “Pepper’s absence . . . was the highlight
of this battle of financial giants.“41 Absence was an error of considerable proportion on Pepper’s part, and seemed to indicate
that he had misjudged the ability of the duPont interests to
marshal support. The matter was building up into a Pepper-Ball
feud, and the opposition took advantage of every chance it had
to attack.
At the West Palm Beach hearings Ball himself appeared as a
witness. He had assurances that no “competent” employee of the
FEC should feel the “slightest concern about his or her future”
under St. Joe Paper Company management. But the commission
later noted that he was a “hostile witness,” who, “while responsive in his answers to some of the questions . . . in answer to many
other questions, he was vague, indefinite, and adroit.” Thus it
was impossible to determine the “fitness” of the paper company
to control the railroad. The ICC concluded that his unwillingness
to disclose facts constituted “an unsatisfactory attitude on the
part of the principal witness of that company.” Of the three congressional figures who presented testimony, Florida Representative Joe Hendricks was the only duPont supporter. He expressed
fears that the merger would “adversely affect the employees” and
he denounced “absentee owners.“42
Representative J. Hardin Peterson and Pepper’s senatorial
colleague, Charles O. Andrews, who cited congressional policy
which favored merging weak railroads with strong ones, sided
with Pepper. An exchange of letters between Andrews and Ball,
who “took Senator Andrews to task for urging the reopening” of
the case was read. Andrews “replied to the effect that his interest
in the proceeding was the welfare of the people.“43
Along with the transcript of the hearings which awaited Pepper on his return to the United States were urgent warnings from
friends and supporters who told him “a great deal of feeling has
39. Davis to Pepper, November 1, 1945 (cable), Pepper Papers, FRC.
40. Pepper to James C. Clements, November 3, 1945 (cable), Pepper Papers,
FRC. Clements was Pepper’s administrative assistant.
41. Jacksonville Journal, November 6, 1945.
42. 267 ICC 295,326, 315, 317, 335.
43. Ibid., 334-35.
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been created in favor of the Florida East Coast being purchased
by the duPont interests.“44 Criticism of Pepper was mounting—
“You certainly have been Crusified [sic] down the East Coast on
this deal”— and a railway labor leader warned that if he did not
quit tampering with the FEC he would be “committing political
suicide.“45 This was a matter of great importance to many people
in Florida, he was informed; his extended stay in Europe had
kept him from knowing what the “Florida folks are doing and
thinking.” He was on the “losing end of public opinion” and
must, “do something about his misunderstood position.“46
Ball had been busy securing the support of chambers of commerce and county commissioners. He had achieved a “masterpiece” in selling his proposal to the public.47 One approach was
to “create the impression that there might be some improper relationship” between Pepper and the Coast Line.48 This was underscored in newspaper editorials which explained Pepper’s actions as motivated by a secret deal with the ACL.49 Pepper reacted by urging other railroads to enter the proceedings. The
Southern and Seaboard did. At first the Southern took essentially
a neutral position, but after the St. Joe Paper Company arranged
preferential treatment for the transfer of freight to the Southern
beyond Chattahoochee, the Southern switched to the duPont side,
claiming its interests were best served by maintenance of the
FEC as an independent carrier. The Seaboard opposed the merger
as well. Pepper had hoped the other lines would offer plans for
consideration, but neither did.50
Pepper was aware of the pitfalls in the path he had chosen.
He said he realized “when I undertook to oppose the duPont
44. Moorman M. Parrish to Clements, November 13, 1945, Pepper Papers,
FRC.
45. Chester S. Dishong to Pepper, n.d. [December 1945]; R. G. Smith to
Pepper, February 7, 1946, Pepper Papers, MB.
46. Parrish to Clements, November 20, 1945, Pepper Papers, FRC.
47. J. A. Cawthon to Pepper, February 24, 1946, Pepper Papers, FRC.
48. Parrish to Clements, November 13, 1945, Pepper Papers, FRC.
49. Palatka Daily News, October 2, 1945; Ft. Lauderdale Daily News, August
7, 1945; Orlando Morning Sentinel, February 1, 1945; Jacksonville Journal,
October 5, 1945.
50. 267 ICC 295, 336ff; Pepper, “Memorandum,” February 14, 1946, 33, 52;
Pepper, “Brief of Claude Pepper, Senator from the State of Florida, in
His Capacity as a Citizen of Florida and on Behalf of the Public, on
Plan of Reorganization,” August 15, 1946, 22; Florida East Coast Railway
Reorganization, transcript of argument at Washington, D. C., October 9,
1946, 4568-69, copy in Pepper Papers, FRC.
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interests that I would be very much vilified and undoubtedly misunderstood” and that the “criticism . . . might achieve the intensity of denunciation or recrimination.” Even though it had
“chanced to become so” he would hold to his course because he
considered Ball and the duPont interests “a menace to the state
. . . not [to] be trusted with a great public utility like this railroad.“51
On February 14, 1946, Pepper filed his promised written statement. Later, on August 15, he submitted a fifty-two page brief to
the ICC, and he also appeared at additional hearings held in
Washington on October 9 and 10. In all three instances his major
emphasis was why the duPont Trust should not control the line
rather than why another plan should be accepted, which tends
to discredit the contention that an “improper relationship” existed between Pepper and the ACL.
In his arguments which did not directly refer to the duPonts
he repeatedly explained the provisions of Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act which placed the major burden of railway reorganization on the ICC in order to relieve the courts of long, drawn out
equity cases. Pepper sought to make clear that owning railway
securities and operating a railroad were two different things and
pointed out a Supreme Court ruling that the ICC could order a
merger despite nonacceptance by creditors.52 Many years earlier
the power of the commission to require disassociation of railroads from other interests had been affirmed in a case which involved the Duke Trust.53 The trail through this legal maze was
only to back up his contention that the “heart of the matter” was
protection of the public interest by joining the FEC to a major
system. It did not matter which trunk line, he said, and gave the
assurance, “I have no connection with the Atlantic Coast Line.”
In order to satisfy him, the Coast Line would have to pay the
“full, fair value of the property,” keep the Jacksonville gateway
open to competitors, and deal fairly with FEC employees.54
51. Pepper to Parrish, December 29, 1945, Pepper Papers, FRC; Railway
Reorganization, argument, October 9, 1946, 4650.
52. United States Supreme Court Reports, “Reconstruction Finance Corporation et al., v. The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad et al.”
(April 10, 1946), Vol. 328, 495.
53. Interstate Commerce Commission Reports, “In the Matter of Proposed
Construction of Lines by Piedmont & Northern Railway Company”
(1928), Vol. 138, 363.
54. Pepper, “Memorandum,” February 14, 1946, 1-5, 38; Pepper, “Brief,”
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But his lengthy and most volatile arguments were ranged
against Ball and the duPont Trust. Apparently ACL President
Davis at first supported Pepper’s thrusts against “the evils which
would result from transfer of control of the East Coast to Mr.
Ball,” but before Pepper submitted the August 15 brief Davis’s
memos had dropped mention of the Trust and only referred to
the advantages of a merger with the Coast Line.55
The Trust, Pepper said, was a “monopolistic concentration of
power,” and he held the belief that “monopoly is undermining
the security and stability of our democratic form of government.”
DuPont’s holdings, including a list of banks and their capitalization, were cited. The “octopus” was solely interested in “developing and making more valuable their property on the east coast.”
It would be folly to turn over a railroad to “inexperienced and
indifferent railroad management.” The logical solution was “a
natural merger . . . or integration into a main system” such as
the Coast Line.56 Ball was an “autocratic power in Florida,” an
“expert propagandist . . . and a thorough realist.” He was “ruthless” and when he “snaps his fingers” his employees have to
“dance.” The “financial and industrial emperor” thought that
“be and he alone had the right to dictate the reorganization
plan,” and his only thought was to build his “empire into a
greater and greater economic system.” The record, where he
avoided definite answers, demonstrated that “Mr. Ball is unfit
to control the Florida East Coast Railway.” His grasp for power
“bodes ill for the people of Florida.“57
At the Washington hearings the bitterness that had developed
between Pepper and the duPont representatives was obvious, and
the Trust’s attorneys struck back with vengeance. After agreeing
that the public interest was indeed at stake, a duPont lawyer said
Pepper was really indifferent to the public interest, because at the
time of the hearings at West Palm Beach Pepper was “in Moscow
learning about the party line.” Pepper, stung by this, called it an
August 15, 1946, 12ff; Railway Reorganization, argument, October 9,
1946, 4559, 4568.
55. Davis, “Memorandum,” July 24, 1946.
56. Pepper, “Memorandum,” February 14, 1946, 15, 34; Pepper, “Brief,”
August 15, 1946, 10, 12, 26; Railway Reorganization, argument, October
9, 1946, 4594; October 10, 1946, 4812, 4816.
57. Pepper, “Memorandum,” February 14, 1946, 16, 17, 21, 23; Pepper,
“Brief,” August 15, 1946, 20, 25; Railway Reorganization, argument, October 9, 1946, 4600.
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“unjustifiable reference” more suitable to the hustings than a
hearing. The duPont attorneys went on to attack Pepper for making the matter into a personal feud with Ball.58
Following the hearings, the ICC issued a third supplemental
report in April 1947, in which it completely reversed its 1945
order. A plan to consolidate the FEC with the Coast Line was
issued in a five-to-four decision with two commissioners abstaining. The commission noted that control of the FEC was a “matter
of the greatest public interest” as exemplified by the mass of
evidence it had received during 1946, and added that “improved
and expedited service” could not be obtained by keeping the FEC
an independent carrier. After a lengthy discussion of the history
of the case the report concluded:
It is clear from the evidence presented, that the St. Joe Company would be in a position, if it controlled the reorganized
debtor, to so control its operation as to further its own interests and the other interests of the duPont estate to the ultimate disadvantage not only of the State but to the detriment
of the national transportation system as well.59
The report spelled out the “fairness of the Coast Line plan”:
bondholders would receive fair value in ACL stock, seniority
rights of employees would be maintained, and connections with
the Southern and Seaboard would be kept open. The Commission stated that the “apprehensions of the citizens and communities of the east coast of Florida that a merger would adversely affect their interests are not justified” because the ACL
would “serve all its territory impartially.” The public would
have a better transportation service.60
Pepper was said to have “let loose” a “shout of triumph”
when he heard of this decision .61 Elsewhere there was gloom. It
was said that the people of the east coast were “shocked and
bitterly resentful” over the fact that the commission had “flouted
the known and proved demand . . . that the Florida East Coast
be maintained as an independent carrier under the operation of
the Florida duPont interests.” Pepper was accused of causing
58. Railway Reorganization, argument, October 9, 1946, 4689ff.; October 10,
1946, 4808.
59. 267 ICC 295, 308, 318, 326, 348.
60. Ibid., 349, 351, 387-89.
61. Miami Herald, May 22, 1947.
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harm to his own state by engaging in a personal feud with Ball
62
for abandoning him in 1944. From Tampa on the west coast,
however, came the view that the merger would mean “less chance
of abuse of power, the public interest will be better served, and
the future of Florida will be brighter.“63 Pepper made a statewide radio address to explain the virtues of the decision, which,
he said, was “based upon sound reasoning and sound public policy. ” “Time and events,” he was certain, would “confirm the
wisdom and justice of the decision.“64
In July 1947, the trustees of the duPont estate issued a statement, claiming the ruling “contrary to the law and facts of the
case.” The order was analyzed in detail to show that it was not
only unlawful but also “unfair” to the workers and bondholders,
and “detrimental to the people of the East Coast of Florida.”
They observed that public support in favor of the duPont plan
had come from every community on the east coast, which “represents the sentiment of a vast majority of the citizens.”
We regret that this plain business matter, of tremendous importance to the entire East Coast of Florida, has as a result of
Senator Pepper’s injecting himself in the case, degenerated
into a political matter in an apparent attempt by the Senator
to obscure the merits of the case and resort instead to improper political lobbying and log-rolling. Many charges and
irresponsible statements have been made.
The trustees wished to refute only one of his statements: the idea
that they had “already made $20 million profit on a very small
investment in Florida East Coast Railway bonds.” “This statement,” they said, “like many others made by Senator Pepper . . .
is grossly inaccurate.” The estate would make no profit because it
looked on its investment as “permanent.” On the other hand, if
the accumulated cash in the FEC treasury were to be handed
over to the Coast Line, the result would be “an investment profit
to the Coast Line of $20,500,000 on the reorganization valuation
and $32,833,000 on the rate-making valuation,” a “tremendous
profit” at the expense of FEC bondholders all with no risk or
investment on the part of the Coast Line.66
62. Ibid.
63. Tampa Tribune, May 22, 1947.
64. Radio Address by Senator Claude Pepper, Florida East Coast Railway
Reorganization Case, May 31, 1947, pamphlet, Pepper Papers, FRC.
65. “Statement by Trustees of duPont Estate.”
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At the time of the ICC report an opinion was written by the
dissenting commissioners on the grounds that the Coast Line was
a “stranger seeking to acquire,” and they warned that the plan
would result in “prolonged litigation.“66 They were correct; the
end was nowhere in sight. The sanguine expressions of public
benefit from the merger were accepted by Pepper, the Coast Line,
and a few minority bondholders. Thirteen groups of creditors requested “further argument and further hearing,” and so in October 1947, the case was reopened again. The ICC had asked the
petitioners to present the “constitutional question,” feeling that
not enough time had been allowed for it. The duPont interests
secured the counsel of former Supreme Court Justice James F.
Byrnes, a member of the Senate at the time Section 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act was amended in 1935. Byrnes held that the plan
was an “involuntary merger” which would deprive his clients of
their property without due process of law. But the commission, in
a six-to-five decision found nothing new brought out in the reargument, and “‘none of the important facts recited in our third
supplemental report . . . challenged either by petition or on reargument.” It reiterated its belief that the proposed merger was
both legal and in the public interest. Backing its decision with a
mass of documentation based on precedents, the commission
flayed those who bought bonds with the expectation of “windfall” profits. The merger plan was reaffirmed in an order of
March 25, 1948.67
In his review of the order, United States District Court Judge
Designate Samuel H. Sibley decided the court did not have to
“consider . . . the public interest,” only “the rights of each class
of creditors and stockholders.” Sibley despairingly said it was
“perfectly futile to waste time and effort to go further into the
matter” since the creditors had already said they would vote
against the merger, which should have been a “last resort” measure by the ICC anyway. Deploring the “partisan struggle” connected with the case, he “disapproved and rejected” the ICC
plan. 68
Stunned Coast Line attorneys found the judge not only hostile
but also unfamiliar with their briefs and recent Supreme Court
66. 267 ICC 295, 390-91.
67. 267 ICC 729 (March 25, 1948), 729-30, 734, 738.
68. “Opinion of Sibley,” 7, 9, 11.
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rulings such as the Denver case on railway reorganizations. He
had relied on a lay definition of “fair and equitable,” they
argued, and had attempted to “read the minds” of the commissioners. In their opinion his decision contained an “extraordinary
combination of errors,” which meant a good chance of having it
reversed in the appeals court.69
They were to be disappointed. In a two-to-one decision of
January 17, 1950, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against
the Coast Line. Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., described the
plan as a “forced merger . . . contrary to statute.” To Hutcheson,
the commission had “closed its eyes” to other possibilities, and
had “in desperation . . . seized upon the Coast Line offer as its
only way out.” The appeals court declared Judge Sibley’s “order
was right. It is AFFIRMED.“70
It had been noted earlier that “few observers expect either
Claude Pepper or Ed Ball to give up short of at least an effort
to get before the Supreme Court.” The Coast Line petitioned the
high court for a writ of certiorari in February 1950, requesting
consideration of whether the ICC had followed the mandates of
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. It also claimed that Judge
Hutcheson’s ruling would “substantially veto” three previous
Supreme Court decisions and create “confusion and uncertainty.”
Despite a call for the court to deal urgently with a matter “which
has been in the Courts since August 31, 1931” the Supreme Court
denied the writ in April 1950.71
After eight years of intensive maneuvering and nearly twenty
years in the courts, the Florida East Coast Railway still remained
in receivership. Although it continued to operate in a normal
fashion, the questions centering around its future remained an
unsettling factor in the economy and politics of Florida. It was
unfortunate for Pepper that the case was not settled by the 1947
decision of the ICC. At that time the Florida Brotherhood of
69. 328 Statutes 495; R. B. Gwathmey to Davis, January 29, 1949; Edward W.
Bourne, “Memorandum on Judge Sibley’s Opinion,” January 27, 1949,
copies in Pepper Papers, FRC.
70. United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, “Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Company et al., v. St. Joe Paper Company et al.,” January
17, 1950, copy in Pepper Papers, FRC.
71. Miami Daily News, October 13, 1946; United States Supreme Court,
“Petition of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,” October term, 1949, 2-5, 33,
copy in Pepper Papers, FRC; New York Times, April 4, 1950.
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Railway Clerks had distributed copies of a letter written by its
state chairman to Pepper accusing the Senator of sponsoring an
“illegal transaction” and of deceiving “the people of Florida and
the employees of the Florida East Coast in particular.” A shrill
succession of paragraphs concluded:
You are not a deity, but you are subject to the will of the
people, although you apparently do not recognize these facts.
I believe this still a government of the people and by, and not
of, for and by CLAUDE PEPPER. If you cannot represent
the people according to the desires of the majority WHY
DON’T YOU GET OUT OF THE SENATE?
It is my personal opinion that you are about as much interested in the welfare of the people of Florida as I am in the
breeding and raising of kangaroos in far-off Australia. The
people of Florida will tell you more impressively than I can
when the proper time comes. Until that time, Senator, why
don’t you “straighten up and fly right?“72
The “proper time” had come. The case, having remained in
abeyance, was on the minds of many union members when Pepper sought the Democratic nomination for the United States
Senate in 1950.
The time also had come for Pepper’s opponents to test their
handiwork, and the results were not disappointing. The Dan
Crisp advertising agency of Jacksonville had been “under orders
to defeat Pepper” since the mid-1940s, and according to a report
a “noose” had been woven for Pepper’s political execution.73
Prominent among the forces which opposed Pepper were the
United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Association
of Manufacturers, and the American Medical Association. Splinter groups and new organizations were coordinated by the Crisp
agency, which, according to one account, sought to “remake the
thinking of Florida.“74 This time there was not only money
available for it, but a candidate, Congressman George Smathers
of Miami, a protege of Pepper’s who “fell into Ball’s pot of
senatorial campaign money and refused to struggle.“75 That the
work of ending Pepper’s political career was well-done became
72.
73.
74.
75.

W. F. Howard to Pepper, July 21, 1947, Pepper Papers, FRC.
Sherrill, Gothic Politics, 143.
Ibid.
Ibid, 149.
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evident when state railway labor officials opposed Pepper against
the advice of their national leadership.
The dichotomy was seen early in the contest. On January 26,
1950, George M. Harrison, national president of the Brotherhood
of Railway Clerks, wrote to labor officials in Florida urging them
to “join in the effort to return one of the greatest of Liberals to
the Senate.“76 But W. F. Howard, state chairman, who received
one of these letters held quite a different view. In a reply that
was mimeographed and sent to union members and officials
throughout the state, he said:
Regardless of what you may consider liberalism in Senator
Pepper, we on the East Coast of Florida cannot forget, and I
had hoped you would not forget what he has attempted to do
and is still attempting to do to the employees of the Florida
East Coast Railway and the legal owners of the property.
I do not, of course, know whether or not the duPont interests
are leading the fight to defeat Pepper, but I certainly hope
and pray they are. Why should we be concerned over a strong
financial interest leading a fight to defeat the man who is out
to destroy our jobs and our homes? I think we should lend
assistance to that strong financial interest.
Howard brought up Pepper’s vote for the wartime Smith-Connally Labor Act, which liberals of Pepper’s stripe had considered
a necessity of war, no matter how much they questioned it or
agonized over it in their own minds. The state chairman
denigrated Pepper’s vigorous fight against the Taft-Hartley Act,
saying it was a meaningless gesture since it did not affect railway
employees. Howard concluded: “I care not one whit about the
labor record in Washington of Pepper’s opponent. I would vote
for anyone opposing Pepper. No one in my opinion could be any
worse or less desirable than Claude Pepper.“77
Railway Labor’s Political League sought to counter the opposition of the disgruntled Florida Brotherhoods by advising
them to “forget about disagreement” with Pepper on the FEC
matter. It was of “relatively small importance” in view of the
way Pepper had always “rendered tremendously valuable serv-

76. George M. Harrison to W. F. Howard, January 26, 1950, copy in Pepper
Papers, MB.
77. Howard to Harrison, February 5, 1950, copy in Pepper Papers, MB.
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ices” and “been right practically all of the time.“78 But the
emotional appeals of men like Upchurch, chairman of the St.
Augustine Chamber of Commerce, were more to the liking of the
rank and file of labor. Upchurch stated that Pepper supported a
merger to “rob St. Augustine of its principal payroll, one-third
of its population, and reduce property values fifty percent.“79 The
Orlando Star chimed in to say that for two years Pepper had
sought to give the Coast Line “a stranglehold on the central part
of the state.“80 The A.F. of L. worked to counter this by publishing special Florida editions of Labor calling on workers, and
especially railway labor, to “vote, to the last man or woman for
Senator Pepper.” Pepper was described as a man who “has never
failed us and the people should not fail him now.“81
Pepper lost the 1950 election, and labor lost one of its best
friends and most staunch supporters in the Senate, a man whose
record was virtually one hundred per cent in labor’s favor, and
who represented the rare phenomenon of an “integrated liberal”
in the South. His defeat was one of several which pointed to a
trend to the right in southern politics and an end to the pro-New
Deal sentiment. Even though he had gotten out of step with
majority views in Florida, Pepper was a genuine advocate of the
“little man” and had maintained a great deal of independence
from the large interests that had begun to move into Florida. His
successor, George Smathers, has been described as a senator who
was closely aligned with business and industry and an exploiter
of patriotic and racial sentiments on the hustings. One journalist
saw him as “the perfect case of the southern politician who,
having treated his constituents to the public orgy of a witchburning, is thereafter left alone to the private orgies of serving
special interests and himself.“82
It is difficult to say just how much Pepper suffered in the
state from the opposition of some labor leaders to his candidacy.
Certainly it must have influenced the attitudes of employees of
the FEC, but whether other parts of the state were particularly
78. Edward H. Wolfe to all general chairmen residing in the state of Florida,
March 28, 1950, copy in Pepper Papers, MB.
79. Frank D. Upchurch to friends, April 26, 1950, copy in Pepper Papers,
MB.
80. Orlando Star, March 31, 1950.
81. Washington, D. C., Labor, April 15, 1950.
82. Sherrill, Gothic Politics, 137.
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concerned is an open question. It seems clear, however, that
among the strongest and oldest unions in the state were the railway brotherhoods, and it is possible that more votes were affected
than might appear likely at first. He lost every east coast county
but Dade, and carried that by less than 1,000 votes.83 One labor
leader later wrote to Pepper that in his “considered judgment
. . . your activities in this ACL-FEC case . . . cost you reelection
to the United States Senate.“84 Pepper replied that the Coast
Line meant nothing to him, and that he held no brief for it, but
rather for the public interest. He concluded with a warning: “I
doubt if anyone could be any worse for the public interest or
these employees themselves than the duPont banking crowd. . . .
Nobody hates labor and everything labor stands for more than
that crowd.“85
After further study by the Interstate Commerce Commission
and extended litigation in the district and circuit courts, the FEC
case again reached the Supreme Court in 1954, where it was held
that the ICC could not order an involuntary merger of the two
railroads.86 Two years later the Coast Line offered to buy the
FEC for $51,000,000, but in 1958 the courts and commission
determined that ownership should be vested in the St. Joe Paper
Company, and the ACL “gave up the fight for control.”87 By
1959 the district court had approved a plan favoring the duPont
interests, and in 1960 the line’s bankruptcy was officially ended.88
Thus, in the view of the courts and the commission, the “public
interest” would be served best by maintaining the line as an independent carrier under a Florida-based corporation. While this
might have seemed a reasonable and clear logic, only time could
really judge the wisdom of any decision regarding the railway.
If there was a feeling of euphoria on the part of labor and
local interests it was dissipated in the early 1960s when the question of railway work rules was being studied on a national basis.
In January 1963, after the FEC claimed exemption from national
83. Report of the Secretary of State of the State of Florida, For the Period
Beginning January 1, 1949 and Ending December 31, 1950 (Tallahassee,
1951), 264-65.
84. Robert G. Smith to Pepper, May 30, 1950, Pepper Papers, MB.
85. Pepper to Smith, July 12, 1950, Pepper Papers, MB.
86. New York Times, April 6, 1954.
87. Ibid., February 1, 1956; April 19, June 3, November 13, 1958.
88. Ibid., December 3, 1960.
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bargaining on rules on the grounds that it operated only within
Florida, eleven non-operating unions struck the line. The company halted operations and at the same time abolished the strikers’jobs.89 Later the company began running trains on a limited
basis using men who were willing to work under its rules. Efforts
of courts, commissions, and boards to have the FEC reinstate the
strikers or put work rule changes into effect failed.90 The strike
was punctuated by “400 acts of violence” which saw dynamiting
of the tracks, and at one time the company itself was said to have
sabotaged one of its own trains.91 In 1965 the State of Florida
succeeded for a time in obtaining a recognition of the “public
interest” when it required the resumption of passenger service,
but the company later sold most of its passenger cars.92 In 1969
the Supreme Court ruled that the company could operate the
road during the strike and reversed a Florida decision which had
prevented picketing.93 The strike lingered on, almost forgotten,
with no end in sight.
The settlement in December 1971, came as a “surprise” to
many. Ed Ball had the reputation of being harder than nails. A
Labor Department official once remarked, “At least nails bend.”
But Ball bent because the $1,500,000 in damages the FEC agreed
to pay the union was only ten per cent of what might have been
exacted under a pending lawsuit. Another reason was a high employee turnover rate, which was costly to the company and undermined its claims of savings. The agreement include a twenty-five
per cent pay raise effective January 1, 1972, for employees hired
prior to 1970, and annual raises of six per cent for the next three
years. There was also a guarantee that no employee would be
“required to cross craft lines.” Even so, FEC wages were “well
below the industry scale,” the work force had been cut in half,
and union membership was no longer required as a condition of
employment. 94
Business Week reported the settlement was “sweet victory for
the unions.“95 Was this really true for the majority of the strik89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Ibid., January 24, 1963.
Ibid., November 10, December 24, 1963.
Ibid., April 8, 1963; Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1965, July 3, 1972.
New York Times, January 15, 196.5; Wall Street Journal, January 10, 1966.
Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1969.
“A Break in Florida’s Nine-Year Strike,” Business Week (December 25,
1971), 18; Wall Street Journal, December 20, 1971.
95. “Break in Florida’s Strike,” 18.
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ers? When the strike began 1,600 workers walked out expecting
the strike to last a few weeks. But weeks, months, and years went
by, and in time 900 went back to work on the company’s terms,
while others found employment elsewhere. Only about 100 stayed
out to the bitter end. There was no “victory” for them. Most were
either too old or unable to pass the physical examination required under the settlement. At the same time the end of the
strike ended the meager union benefits that had enabled them to
survive.96 A New York Times article depicting the plight of one
of these men probably has greater accuracy. Under the headline,
“Gloom Marks End of Long Florida Rail Strike,” it described
how the strike had reduced a once proud railroad man to a state
of poverty and destitution.97 The Wall Street Journal found a
“very satisfied” Ball the winner of the strike. As one worker put
it, “God knows he ought to be, he ran the unions off. And that’s
what he set out to do so he could run the railroad the way he
wanted to.“98
The road to this outcome was accurately forecast in 1946 by
a newsman who predicted that once Ball got the railroad he
would lapse back into his “public be damned attitude.” He urged
Pepper to “let the duPonts have the railroad and then criticize
their operation.“99 This was good advice, but Pepper rejected it.
For an astute man to ignore that advice and the warnings of
friends and supporters seems out of character, but Pepper was an
idealist who believed that labor was depending on him to fight
for their rights. The feeling that he could not let labor down
compelled him to disregard the possibility of untoward consequences coming from his actions. Also, he seemed to think it
was possible for a public figure to act as a private citizen.
More than anything, however, Pepper was a liberal. Since the
Broward era liberals have opposed corporation domination in
Florida.100 To them Ball became a very real symbol of evil to be
opposed at all costs. Pepper would have fought Ball in any case,
but the fact that they had split openly in 1944 certainly made it
96. Wall Street Journal, December 20, 1971.
97. New York Times, December 26, 1971.
98. Wall Street Journal, July 3, 1972.
99. J. A. Cawthon to Pepper, February 20, 1946, Pepper Papers, MB.
100. Samuel Proctor, Napoleon Bonaparte Broward, Florida’s Fighting Democrat (Gainesville, 1950), 62, 151.
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easier to attack. The results were tragic for everyone but the
duPont Trust. Pepper was right about the consequences of a
takeover for labor, but the constituency realized its error too late
to pay back Pepper for his continued effort which almost had the
quality of sacrifice.
To remain in office Pepper could not afford to sacrifice a
single vote. A “conservative-progressive” stance earned Duncan U.
Fletcher twenty-seven years in the Senate, and Pepper was an
anomaly whose strength clearly had been waning since 1944.101
By miscalculating the extent to which his participation in the
FEC matter would alienate many of his old supporters on the
east coast and by badly underestimating Ball’s strength and ability to win support, not to mention intensifying Ball’s hostility,
Pepper himself added the last straw to the forces which led to his
defeat. Afterwards he said he had “been in a dilemma for a good
long while about whether I should seek to continue to represent
Florida in the Senate or not.“102
Was the fight worth what it cost? Labor probably would say
“No.” Pepper, as an idealist and liberal, would probably reply,
“No, but I would go the same route again.” Ball probably would
say “Yes.” In any event, it can only be hoped that from the
travail of the past will come a new viability and stability which
those connected with the case so richly deserve.
101. Wayne Flynt, Duncan Upshaw Fletcher, Dixie’s Reluctant Progressive
(Tallahassee, 1971), vii.
102. Pepper to Earl Faircloth, May 22, 1950, Pepper Papers, MB.

Published by STARS, 1973

25

